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IN ~fHE SUPREME COURT 
OF 1'HE STATE OF lJTAH 
)lERY~~ ,J. RUS.SE~.L ancl 1\D,\ \ 
.J. RUSSELL, lus wife, ) 
P1aintilf s and Hcs1Ju11rlc.·1ts. 
VS I · Case No. 
(~EYSER-_MARION GOLD ~IIX- ). io577 
2 NG COiiIP ANY. a corporation, 
THE BOTH,VELL CORPORA-
T I (E'\. a corporation, et al, 
Defendants and A jJjdlants. / 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
The respondents do not agree with the appellants' 
statement of facts appearing in their brief under the 
headings "Cndi:-;puted Facts'', pp. 2-7 awl "Argument 
011 the Facts'·, pp. 7-Hi. Yery pertinent facts are omit-
ted. ...:\lso, the appellants ha1·e eonsistently ignored 
facts \\"h:eli support the findings of the trial court, and 
1 
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have relied heavily upou evidence which the trial eourt 
obviously did not belie,'e. The respondents will be rc-
f ered to as the "plaintiffs" and the appellants will be 
ref erred to as the "defendants." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The subject matter of this litigation consists of 
43 patented mining claims. Oue group, hereinafter 
referred to as the "Upper Group", consists of 12 elaims 
located in a mountainous area north of the old town 
of Mercur in Tooele County; and the other group, 
hereinafter referred to as the "Lower Group" eonsists 
of 31 claims located on the sagebrush bench a few miles 
southwest of Mercur. The 12 claims included in the 
Upper Group are: 
Black Shale, Lot 3029, Hecla, Hecla Nos. 1, 
2, 3, and 4, area 66.21 ac.; Douglas No. 1, area 
27.83 ac.; Buena Vista, Gold Button, .Marv .J ea11 
Fraction, l\iary Jean Nos. land 2, area 57.25 ac. 
The 31 claims included in the Lower Group are: 
Quartet No. 1, Kansas Boy, Kansas lloy 
Fraction, Kansas Boy No. 3, Kansas Boy No. +, 
and Garnet Mountain, area 80.973 ac.; Syndi-
cate Nos. 1 and 2, Monopolist Nos. 1 to 8, La-
Cigale Mining Dist. area 107.40 ac.; 'Vest Shore, 
Selma, Sister .Mary, 'Vest Selma, Alice, Four 
o'clock, Esther, Maggie Kelly, Houest Diek. 
Lola Barker and Black Sheep, LaCigale, Min-
ing Dist., area 184.27 ae.; Ivanhoe, Coin awl 
Tr~r Agaiu, Albion, area 64.376 ac. in l\Iercur 
.:\fining Dist. 
2 
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The maps, Exhibits 18, ID and :!O, sho-.1· the lucatiu11s 
of the claims. 
Tl1e claims are 11ot fe11eed 11or otherwise marked 
oil the ground (Tr. "27). The only ties on the ground 
of the Upper Group were to an area k11mn1 as the 
":.Iilk Raneh" which is loeated at the junetion of ~lereur 
Canyon and :;\Ieaduw Canyon and to the "Sparrow 
Hawk Spring,'' located in ~lercm Ca11yon some dis-
taue<.: north of the .Milk Ranch. lt will be noted b~, an 
examination of plaintiffs' Exhibit :d that tlie .\lilk 
Raueli awl Sparrow Hawk Spring arc loeated imme-
<li~: teJy north and a little east of the Northwest corner 
of Section 5, Township G South, Rauge 3 'Ve~t, SLB-
&M. Exhibit 21 is a topographie map and clearly indi-
cates tLe l'.anyons and springs. By referring to the 
sections designated on plaintiffs' Exhibit 19 which shows 
the mining claims and section lines, the general area 
covered by the Upper Group can be determined. The 
Hecla group consisting of 5 claims is located south and 
cast of the Milk Ranch and the other 7 claims in th.' 
C pper Group are rather widely scattert>rJ tf1 thr north 
arnl northeast of the Milk Ranch. 
l\Iuch of the testimony in the record regarding the 
grazing of livestock on the mining claims is general 
in nature. Smne of the testin1011y is tied to the Milk 
Ranch all<l Sparow Hawk with respect to tlie Upper 
l; rou p a1 :d to the cemetery on the he11eli be low ;\Iercur 
l an.\·011 witli respect to the Lower Group. Other tes-
tiil1011.1' ,.,·as based on anJwed knowledge of the location 
of the claims. 
.3 
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Both parties assert ownership based on rccor.! 
title to the mining claims. The appellants' statement 
regarding the pertinent conveyances of the claims i, 
not complete, and an agreement which preceded by :1 
f nv days the conveyance of May 24<, l!J34< from Samuel 
.T orgensen and wife to Glen R. Bothwell is complete]~· 
ignored. The deeds from Samuel .T orgensen an<l wife 
to Geyser-Marion and to Glenn R. Bothwell effectually 
severed the grazing rights from the mineral rights and 
thereafter the records disclose two separate chains of 
title. The appellants' chart and discussion of the chaiu 
of title coyering "grazing rights" is not complete. The 
complete list of recorded documents conyeying th~ 
grazing rights follows : 
Grazing Ri,qhts 
Parties Dnlc .Abstract Entries 
Samuel .;fprgensens to 
A. C. Nordell ~-11-;JU 110 
George J orgensens to 
.Merlin Johnson :z- rn-:rn 111 
l\Ierlin Johnson to 
A. C. Nordell :J- l 7 -JU 11 :.! 
A. C. Nordell to 
Tony Castagno U- :.'- t.J 15·1 
Tony Castagno to 
Rose Castagno t-28-:rn Exhibit z;) 
Tony Castagno to 
Rose Castagno 11- :3-GO Exhibit 22 
Rose Castagno to 
Joseph Rothe l~-l::HiO Supp. Abs. p. 5 
Joseph Rothe to Menin 
J. Russell and wife ~:2-1-±-()0 Supp. r\..bs. p. 'i 
4 
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The appellants' statement of facts omits ExhiL:t 
17 ( ll. Gl-62) which provides: 
"AGREEMENT 
This agreement, made the 8th day of .May, 
1934, by and between Samuel Jorgensen a~d 
}Iary Jorgensen, his wife, and George .A .. Tor-
gensen and Rose Jorgensen, his wife, hereinafter 
designated as the Sellers and Glenn R. Hotln~'ell, 
a single man hereinafter designated as the bu>·er, 
Witnesseth, 
'YHEREAS, the sellers are indebted t,i the 
receiver of The Tooele State Bank i11 the sum 
of $11,600.00, and 
'VHEREAS, the buyer has submitted to said 
receiver an off er to pay said receiver the sum of 
$7,500.00 to purchase the bank's interest in t;1~ 
abow obligatwns and the securities held, which 
off er is being considered by the said receiver but 
must be submitted to the District Court for final 
confirmation which it is expected will be given, 
NOYV THEREF_OR, for and in considera-
tion of One Dollar in hand paid each to the 
other, it is mutually agreed as follows by the 
parties hereto; 
Sellers agree to co~vey to buyer upon deli,·e1-y 
to them of a_ll of the obligation against them now 
held by the bank and buyer agrees to accept such 
conveyance and to cancel all of such obligations 
in case he is able to become the purchaser as 
stated above, the following described property; 
to wit, 
( Deseiptiou of all of the mining claims iu-
rnked in this suit.) 
5 
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Subject to grazing rights which arc rescnec! 
by the Sellers. 
IN "TJTNESS \VHEREOF the parties 
hereto have hereunto set their hands," 
(Signatures and acknowledgment) 
On page 5 of the appellants' brief appears the foj. 
lowing: 
"From and after 1944 Owen Ault grazed live-
stock on and leased all of said mining claims 
from and paid rental to defendant each and every 
year until the commencement of this action." · 
Statements to the same effect appear on p. 6. The 
writer of appellants' brief makes the statement: 
"Ault ran HOO head of sheep on said claims 
for 20 years, '1'146-11" 
It will be noted by turning to page H6 of the transcript 
that there is no reference to running sheep on the min-
ing claims. Page 154 of the transcript is also cited iu 
support of a similar statement. The testimony on that 
page has ref ere nee onl~· to the leasing of claims. Other 
references to the transcript on page 6 of the appellants' 
brief are erroneous and misleading. See Tr. 26, .J.6, 48 . 
. 53 and 159. The witnesses were testifying regarding 
the grazing of livestock with respect to a grazing line 
established by the Bureau of Land Management. The 
testimony did not refer to specifie mining claims. 
Evidence refuting the appellants' assertion uwler 
the heading, "Crnlisputed Facts", that the clefewlaub' 
6 
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les.~<:c gra:,r,ed liYestock on the mining claims C\Try year 
since l DJ..J. is summari:,r,ed below: 
O•se11 Ault testified that he herded sheep 011 lhc 
}lcrcur Beneh only three times and several times small 
bu11el1es of sheep drifted down to the graveyard. (Tr. 
187-189). 'Ve quote: 
"(~. ~ow those are the only times that you 'vc 
ever had your sheep and held them on the ::\ [ereur 
Beneh or in the Yicinitv of the Mereur Bench. 
is that right? . 
A. \Vhen I have trailed them around there 
that I have told you. 
<-.l. Those three times. pli:s tlie times that some 
have drifted down? 
A. Yes." (Tr. 189). 
It will be noted that :n of the 43 claims inrnlved 
JJl this suit are located on Mercur llench. See Exhibit 
rn. (Tr. 49). 
Tony Castagno never saw .Ll.ulfs sheep 0;1 the 
Lower Group of claims. (Tr. -1<9). 
'fhe findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree 
are based on the record ownership by the plainfiffs of 
the gra:,r,ing rights on the mining claims. They are not 
based on ad verse use ( R. ()8-72) . 
Findin<)' No. 3 that: "For many years last i)ast the b • • 
plailltiffs and their predeeessors in interest ha,·e li':cd 
the s11rfaee of said mining claims for livestock grazing" 
( H. ()!)) is supported by competent evidenee. Sel 
7 
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the transcript pages, 5-8; 46; 64; 66-88; 93-95; ()(j; !JI; 
104-107; 134. 
This evidence is important to show that the plain-
tiffs and their predecessors were seized or possessed o'.' 
the property within seven years before commencemeni. 
of the action, as required by section '78-12-5 Utah Code 
Ann. 1953 and to show that the successive owners of 
the mining claims made use of the reserved grazing 
rights. This is one of the circumstances which supports 
the trial court's construction of the agreement, Ex-
hibit 17 and the deeds dated June 7, 1932 (See Ab-
tract, Ex. 15, Entry 103) and the deed dated .i.\la>· 
24, 1934 (Ex. 2). 
Another significant fact ignored by the def cndants 
statement of facts is the decree quieting title to the 
.Black Shale claim in which the court in 1936 held that 
Geyser-Marion had title subject to the rights resened 
by the J orgensens in the 1932 deed. The language of 
the decree is: 
Subject, however, to the following: 
"The rights reserved by the defendants George 
A. Jorgensen and Rose Jorgensen, his wife, ancl 
Samuel J o,.rgensen and Mary Jorgensen, his 
wife, in that certain deed executed by said last 
named persons, recorded September 19, 1932, 
in Book 3-S of Deeds at page 17.3, in the office 
of the Countv Reeorcler of Tooele Countv, Ctab. 
and that the. title of said Geyser Mari;m Gold 
.Miuiug Compau~., :~ corporation, the plaintiff 
herein, to said premises, property, arnl minin1; 
claims is hereby adjudged to be quieted agains: 
8 
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all claims and demands or prete11sions of the 
defendants, or either or anv of them, said defend-
an~s .and each of them bei~1g hereby perpetually 
en.Joined from setting up any claim to said prem-
ises, property and mining claims or to any pa~·t 
thereof." See Ex. 15, Entry 109. 
It will be noted that not only Geyser-Marion and 
the J orgensens were parties to the decree, but also the 
administrator of the Estate of Glenn R. Bothwell, the 
grantee in the 1934 deed from the J orgensens was a 
party. After the decree quieting title in them to the 
'surface rights", the Jorgensens by a deed dated Fcb-
rnar,\' 11, 1939 conveyed the "grazing rights" to A. C. 
X ordell, one of plaintiffs' predecessors. 
The 1932 deed to Geyser-l\Iarion in which smfacc 
rights were reserved described not only the Black Shale 
claim, but also the other 12 claims in the Upper Group. 
The Hecla and Hecla Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 were conveyed 
by Bothwell to Geyser-Marion in 1934. (Ex. 1.5, 
Entry 115). This was two years before the decree 
<1uieting title. 
The eYidence is conclusive that the only taxes 
assessed against the mining claims during the perio<l 
Hl4() to 1960 were against the mineral rights (Ex. ()). 
See also the testimony of "r eudell H. Anderso11, Tooele 
County Assessor, that the surface rights on the mining 
l'laims were neYer assessed for taxation (Tr. 12U, 127). 
Dmi11g the trial ~Ienin .T. Russell was asked whether 
lie "as willing to pay taxes if the court found he was 
obligated to pay and he ans\\'ered '·yes" A formal 
tender was made (Tr. 29). 
9 
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STATEl\IENT OF POINTS 
1. The findings of fact are supported by competent 
evidence. 
2. The language in the Jorgensen deed resencd 
grazing rights which passed to the plaintiffs by deeds 
of record. 
3. Appellants' points based 011 equity are withou' 
merit. 
4. Statutes of limitation lmYe no application. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SLTP. 
PORTED BY COMPETENT EYIDENCK 
Clotworthy v. Clyde, 1 Utah 2d 251, 263 P. 2d 420, 
states a settled principle in this jurisdiction regarding 
the findings of fact as found by the trial judge: 
"'i\There the trial court has looked to surrournl-
ing circumstances to determine intent because 
instruments of title leave ambiguity or uncer-
tainty as to intent, the Supreme Court will uot 
disturb the trial court's findings nor judgment 
bi0 ed thereon unless the weight of the evidence 
is clearly against them or trial court has mis-
applied principles of law or equity." (Emphasis 
added). 
The above rule that the trial court's findings of 
fact will uot be overturned uuless clearly against tlic 
10 
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e\·idcnce has been applied by the Supreme Court i11 
both cases of law (Jensen v. Howell, 7 5 Utah 64) 282 
P. 10;H) and cases of equity (Metropolitan Invest-
ment Company vs. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P.2d 940). 
The Trial Court's findings of fact were as follows: 
(I) Plaintiffs are owners of the exclusive 
right to use for livestock grazing purposes the 
surface of the mining claims provided the graz-
ing be done in such manner as not to interfere 
with mining ( R. 68, 69). 
( 2) For many years last past plaintiffs and 
their predecessors in interest haYe used the sur-
face of the mining claims for grazing ( H. G9) . 
( 3) Plaintiffs shall pay one-half of the taxes 
assessed annually against the mining claims as 
long as they are not used for mining purposes. 
Use of the land for mining would be within the 
knowledge of the mining company and may not 
be apparent to the surface users. The surface 
users would be obliged to pay one-half the taxes 
upon demand or notice ( R. 69) . 
Taking the findings of fact separately and looking 
to the record it is certain that the evidence very clearly 
supports the findings. 
Ref erring to Finding No. (I) above, plaintiffs claim 
their right through the grantors named in the deed, 
Defendants' .Exhibit No. 2. That deed effectually 
severed the grazing rights from the miueral rights. 
See the chain of title to the grazing rights, page -t of 
this brief. Rending the language of the deed in light 
of the surrounding circumstances including the agree-
11 
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ment between the original parties entered into shortl.r 
before the deed was executed (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 
17, R. 61 and pages 5-6 of this brief) it becomes obYious 
that the parties to that deed intended that the grantor 
retain the grazing rights. The matter of the construetion 
of the deed is more fully discussed under Point :.!. 
As to Finding No. ( 2), the testimony clearly shows 
possession by the plaintiffs and their predecessors of 
the surface of the mining claims for many years lust 
past. See page 7 of this brief, also see the followi11g 
pages of the transcript: 5-8; 46; 64; 66-88; 93-95; 9(); 
97; 104-107; and 134. It should be noted that clefernl-
ants' leasee only had his sheep on 31 of the .J.3 claims 
three times over a period of nearly 30 years. Sec p•1gc 7' 
of this brief, see also Tr. 187-189. 
On the third point, there was no evidence produced 
which would show that defendants gave notice to plain-
tiffs or demanded the payments of the taxes. It is clear 
that if defendants did use the claims for mining pur-
poses this might not be apparent to the plaintiffs, be-
cause of underground operations. Defendant is in the 
best position to know if mining is being done on the 
claims or not. It should be noted that plaintiffs cluring 
the trial agreed to pay any taxes the court fouwl they 
were obligated to pay and made a formal tender of the 
taxes (Tr. 29). 
On the basis of the eYiclence before the co mt th' 
evidence clearly supports the findings of fact and, there-
fore, they should not be disturbed. 
12 
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:!. THE LANG-UAGE OF THE JORGEN-
SEN DEED RESERYED GRAZING RIGHTS 
"'HICH PASSED TO THE PLAINTIFFS llY 
DEEDS OF RECORD. 
The deed through which both parties claim title, re-
ferred to herein as the "Jorgensen deed", is from Sam-
uel and George Jorgensen and their wives to Glenn R. 
Bothwell and is dated May 24, 1934. It describes all of 
the mining claims involved in this suit and others and 
contains the following language: 
"The Grantee herein agrees that the Granton; 
shall have the right to use the surface of the 
ground for grazing purposes, the grazing to be 
done in such a manner as not to interfere with 
any mining that the Grantee elects to do. The 
Grantors agree to pay one-half of the general 
taxes assessed against the land, as long as it is 
not used for mining purposes." 
The plaintiffs contend and the trial court found that 
the language quoted above constitutes a reservation b~· 
the grantors of the grazing rights on the mining claims; 
that grazing rights are property rights and that there 
is an unbroken chain of title to the grazing rights hr 
deeds of record from the J orgensens to the plaintiffs. 
See page 4 of this brief. 
The law is well settled that the language of n deed 
is construed according to the intention of the parties 
as determined from the generally accepted meaninµ· 
of th~ words when applied to the subject matter ancl 
13 
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read in light of the surrounding circumstances of tLc 
parties at the time of execution. 
The case of Coltharpe v. Coltharpc, 4<8 Utah :38!' .. 
mo P. 121, states the rule for construing the langu;1g. 
of a deed as follows: 
"The rule of construction applicable to in-
struments of writing, including deeds, in this 
jurisdiction is that the intention of the parties, 
as the same is made apparent from the ordinary 
and generally accepted meaning of the language 
used by them when applied to the subject matter 
of the writing in light of the surrounding cir-
cumstances of the parties at the time, controls 
rather than mere technical words, and phras~s." 
See also: 'Vood, et al, vs. Ashby, et al, 122 l'tali 
580, 253 P. 2d 351. 
Also, the modern trend is that the intention of the 
parties when manifest or ascertained will prevail over 
all technical rules of construction. 26 C.J.S. 807; 2li 
C.J.S. lOll, 1012; Haynes vs. Hunt, 96 Utah 348, 85 
P.2d 861. 
A reservation in a deed is defined as "some right i:1 
favor of the gnmtor created out of, or retained i11 the 
granted premises." Dubois YS. Judy, 126 NE HH. :ZUl 
Ill. 340. 
In Johnson vs. Peck, 90 Utah 544, 63 P.2<1 251. 
this Court defined a reservation as the creation in belwlt' 
of the grantor of a new right issuing out of the thin;:, 
granted, something which did not exist as an iudepcrnl· 
ent right before the grant. 
14 
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It will be observed that the la11guage in the deed 
in question creates out of the property conveyed rights 
in favor of the grantors (grazing rights) which did not 
exist as an independent right before the grant. The 
language of the deed fits squarely within the definition. 
"Fhat is the effect of the reservation? It caned 
out of the fee simple title certain rights, which there-
after may be conveyed by the grantors. The grantee 
did not get such reserved rights and therefore could 
not pass them on. It has been held: 
'Vhere a grantor reserves a right, interest, estate 
or easement in conveyed land the grantee and his suc-
cessors in interest take subject to the restrictions im-
posed. 
City of Missoula vs. Mix, 214 P.2d 22, 123 .Mont. 
365. 
A right or interest reserved in a conveyance will 
be effective as against all who deraign title through the 
grantee. 
Malamphy vs. Potomac Edison Co. ('V. ,-a.) 8:3 
SE 2d 755. 
An exception of an interest in land contained in a 
deed is notice to the grantor and his successors. 
Brown vs. Mathis (Ga.) 41 SE 2d 137. 
\Vhat was the intention of the parties? 
The land described in the deed is suitable for graz;-
mg on the surface and the sub-surface is suitable for 
15 
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mining. The grantors of the deed, Exhibit No. :!, were 
ranchers and interested in having assured rights t(1 
graze their cattle. The grantee on the other hand mh 
interested in mining and it is apparent from the h11-
guage of the deed that the grazing by the grantors w1h 
not to interfere with the mining by the grantee. )~ut. 
no other limitation was placed upon the grazing right. 
lly looking at the surrounding circumstances, it , 
can be seen that on .May 8, 1934, the grantors and tlw 
grantee of the deed in question, Defendants' Exhibit 
No. 2, entered into a preliminary agreement for the 
sale of the land, Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 17, pages 5-li 
of this brief. The language, "Subject to grazing rights • 
which are reserved by the Sellers'', clearly shows the 
parties' intentions. The grantor intended to cmffey th~; 
land, but reserved a part of the bundle of rights making 
up the fee-the grazing rights. And, the grantee in-
tended to accept something less than the fee-a tit!,'. 
subject to the grantors' grazing rights. 
It is evident that both parties to the deed treated 
the language as a reservation which passes with the 
land. The J orgensens intended to retain a proper'.;· 
right because they conveyed it by Warranty Deed [() 
A. C. Nordell. See Exhibit 15, Entr~· 110. The deed • 
to Nordell was recorded. 
The evidence shows, (Defendants' Exhibits :\1m. 
7, 8, 9, and 10), that after A. C. Nordell had ac(1uirc1: 
the grazing rights he paid one-half of the taxes as stipu 
lated in the deed, year after year, and the owner of tk 
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mmmg claims, Bothwell Corporation, accepted those 
payments. The acceptance of the payments conclusiyel~· 
shows that the Bothwell Corporation recognized the 
property right which existed in Nordell and it also 
shows that the Bothwell Corporation recognized that 
the intention of the original parties was to have the 
grazing rights remain with the grantors. 
Looking to the language of the deed, we see that 
with respect to the grazing right, no specific person 
is uamed but, the general terms "grantors" and "gran-
tee" are used. There is nothing to imply a life estate 
or lesser interest. Section 52-1-2, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, provides: "The term 'heirs' or other technical 
words of inheritance or succession are not requisite 
to transfer a fee in real estate." Metropolitan Invest-
ment Company vs. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 376 P.2d 940, 
an action to quiet title by discounting a covenant in 
a deed, holds: 
"The words 'assigns, etc.' omitted from a re-
strictive covenant does not necessarily preclude 
a finding that the restriction runs with the land 
in a given case where the intentions of the parties 
and surrounding circumstances warrant such a 
finding ... where the duration of the restrictive 
covenant is not specified, the covenant will be 
limited to such time as seems reasonable, con-
sidering the nature of the circumstances of the 
case ancl the purpose of its imposition." 
Thus, it is clear that the omission of the words of 
inheritance in the resenation has 110 effect. It is still 
the intention of the parties which controls. 
17 
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The language of the reservation contains a re-
striction of the grazing right. It says: " ... the grazi11''' 
I°) 
to be <lone in such a manner as not to interfere wit1 1 
any mining that the grantee elects to do.'' Therefore, 
the only limitation on the grazing right is that it shal! 
not interfere with the mining. As there is no evidence 
in this case that grazing interfered with the mi11i:1g. 
it is clear that the grazing right has not been terminated. 
This deed indicates that it was the intention of the 
original parties to the deed that the grantors should 
have the surface grazing rights perpetually unless thcr2 
was interference with mining. That this was the intc11-
tion is shown by the conduct of the parties, name]:,-. 
recorded conveyances of grazing rights for nearl;· :in 
years which gave notice of the right and were not cun-
tested by Bothwell or his successors. 
The decree quieting Geyser-l\1arion's title to the 
lllack Shale claim, subject to outstanding surface right~; 
in the J orgensens, is significant in that it clearly treat.·; 
such rights as propert~r rights. It is especially im-
portant because Geyser-Marion owned all of the uppu 
group of claims when the decree was entered. See page' 
8-9 of this brief. 
\Vi th regard to the agreement, Ex. 17, it was part 
of the surrounding circumstances at the time the deed 
·was executed and thus could properly be considered 
to show the intent of the parties expressecl in an am-
biguous deed. 26 S.J.S. Sec. 91, p. 840, Note :2. [11 r' 
Anderson's Estate. :235 P. 2d G70, IGO C}i. :2d 5-'5~. 
Standring Y. Mooney, 127 P. 2d 401, 14 \Yash. :Zd :2~~L. 
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The case cited by defendants, Knight vs. Southern 
Pacific Railroad, 52 Utah J2, 172 P. 693, as support 
for the rule that a written contract to convey real prop-
rrty is merged into a deed is not in point. In that case 
there was no ambiguity in the deed. The problem of 
examining extrinsic evidence to determine the intention 
of the parties was not involved. 
Considering all of the above, plaintiffs submit that 
the intent of the parties at the time the deed was ex-
ecuted as evidence by the language in the deed, the 
surrounding circumstances, and the action of the parties 
to the deed and their successors is clearly shown to be 
that the grazing rights were reserved by the grantors. 
3. THE APPELLANTS' POINTS BASED 
ON EQUITY ARE VVITHOUT MERIT. 
The appellant contends that the maxims of equity: 
"He who seeks equity must do equity" (Points VI 
and VII) and "Equity will not enter an order impos-
sible to enforce" (Point X) apply in this case. It is 
argued that the first maxim applies because the plaintiff 
has not paid one-half the general taxes. The deed pro-
Yides that the grantors are to pay "one-half the general 
taxes assessed against the land, as long as it is not used 
for mining purposes." The record is clear: ( 1) That 
the only taxes assessed are not geueral taxes but taxes 
assessed Ly the State Tax Commission pursuaut to 
Chapter 59-G U.C.A. 1953 against the mineral rights, 
and ( 2) That the plaintiff tendered one-half of the taxes 
19 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
if the court found they were due (Tr. 29). This wa, 
clearly an offer to do equity. Further, the defernliwls 
are in no position to complain because they han eoL 
lected rental on the plamtiff s' grazing rights since rn i:. 
In the year 1944 they collected rent from Mr. A.ult 
and one-half the taxes from Mr. Nordell! (Sec Ex.i. 
7, 8, 9 and 10 and Tr. 168, 200, 204, and 2fi0). 
''Tith respect to the second maxim, it is contended 
that because of the location of the mining claims it is 
impossible for the plaintiffs to use them without tres-
passing. The Lower Group of claims comprising :;1 
are in a single block and are adjacent to Bureau of 
Land :Management land on which the plaintiff~> !um 
a grazing permit (Tr. 10, 11). The Upper Group 
are "checker boarded" with Bureau of Land "'.\Iauag,·-
ment tracts and private tracts. The undisputed eridc11cc 
shows that the 12 claims in dispute are on the plaintiffs' 
side of a grazing line established by the 13ureau ol 
Land Management (Tr. 10, 102, 104, and 105). 
Also, it is well known that practical exchanges <i!° 
use of land-locked parcels are frequently made betwcc:; . 
the government and private landowners to aYoid tres-
pass. 
It is apparent that the maxims of equity haYe no 
application to this case. 
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-t.. STATUTES OF LIMITATION HAYI~~ 
XO APPLICATION. 
The defendants contend that the plaintiffs' cause 
of action is barred by statutes of limitation: Section 
78-12-23 (Point IV) and 78-12-5.1, 78-12-5.2, 78-12-
12.l and 78-12-12 (Point VIII). The argument in 
support of Point IV is that this is an action "to recoyer 
mesne profits of real property" or is an action on a 
written contract and is therefore barred by the six year 
statute. The mere statement of the argument refutes 
it. This is an action to quiet title to a real property right. 
The plaintiffs are not seeking to recoYer "mesne profits" 
from the defendants nor from Ault. The only issue 
1s the ownership of grazing rights. 
'\Tith respect to Point VIII it is assumed by the 
defendants that the defendants because they leased 
the grazing rights to Ault had "exclusive possession", 
that therefore the plaintiffs and their predecessors had 
no possession and that therefore the plaintiffs were not 
in possession within seven years and had no standing 
to bring suit. It is also apparently argued that the 
plaintiffs have not acquired title by adverse possession 
because they have not paid taxes and been in exclusive 
possession for seYen years. 
The competent evidence of the grazing of sheep 
and cattle on the unfenced claims is set out in the state-
ment of facts. This constitutes possession to meet the 
rec1uirements (possession within seven years) of the 
0111~· statute of limitations which is at all applicable, 
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Section 78-12-5 and this statute was not pleaded a11(\ 
therefore cannot be considered. See Rule 9 (h), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Tanner v. Proy0 
Res. Co., 78 Utah 158, 168, 2 P.2d 107. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's ruling that the grantor intended : 
by the ambiguous .Jorgensen deed to reserve grazing 1 
rights is supported by competent extrinsic evidence 
1
1 
consisting of (a) the practical construction by the 
parties, (b) the recognition of Bothwell Corporation 
of grazing rights subsequently conveyed to Nordell, 
( c) the eight deeds of record conveying grazing rights 
from the J orgensens to the plaintiffs over a period of 
thirty-years which were never attacked by Geyser-
Marion or its predecessors, ( d) the use of the miuing 
1 
claims by the plaintiffs and their predecessors including f 
the J orgensens from 1934 to the commencement of 
this action and ( e) the unambiguous agreement, Ex. 
17, dated a few days before the .Jorgensen deed and a' 
a part of the same transaction which spelled out speci-
fically that the grazing rights were reserved. The judg-
ment of the trial court shoulcl be affirmed. 
Respectfully 5ubmitted, 
E. J. SKEEN 
Attorney for Respondents 
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